

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

NOV 18 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT: "Winter of Discontent"

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Allen Dulles from C. D. Jackson
dated November 16, 1953, above subject

1. I have discussed the above reference with [REDACTED] Chief of EE and we agreed that in view of the very short period of time permitted for comment, the following points should be suggested to Mr. Dulles for purposes of the OCB meeting.

a. The premises set forth by Mr. Jackson in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the reference do not entirely coincide with our understanding of the present intelligence on the areas in question. We believe that under any circumstances, these premises should be carefully checked with the appropriate people on Bob Amory's staff.

b. Assuming however that some form of active discontent is evidenced in the satellites in question, we would feel it very important for each of the questions raised in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the reference to be considered by the State Department. It is our feeling that the Russians have made it pretty clear that they intend to keep control of Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany and it is further our feeling that regardless of the size of any imagined uprising, the Russians have ample power to maintain their control unless substantial military assistance is provided by one or more of the free world powers. Since it is our understanding that no such outside aid is contemplated within present policy, it would seem contrary to our best interests as well as those of the satellites to undertake any action which might be construed as sponsoring active opposition to the Soviet within any part of the Soviet Bloc. We would therefore assume for example that RIAS would not undertake any relaying of a strike call or in any way be a medium for urging such a call or even urging riots. On the other hand RIAS might well, as it did during the June 17 riots, broadcast news flashes of events which had already occurred.

c. With regard

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

c. With regard to renewal of food offers we feel that there are so many considerations such as the accuracy of the premises mentioned above, the availability of food, the method whereby such offers are made (e.g. how would they be made to Poland as distinguished from an adjoining territory like East Germany), that it is impossible, on short notice, to do any more than recommend further analysis of available intelligence and other related problems.

d. With respect to an offer of asylum to border guards, it is our understanding that it is the United States position that asylum will be offered to anyone who defects for political reasons, consequently the only issue in this respect would seem to be to what extent repetitions of the asylum offer would be made public in order to persuade possible defections plus helpful action prior to defection. On this point we feel that it would certainly be useful to make known again the possibility of asylum if a situation of active unrest develops.

e. With respect to diplomatic exploitation in case of unrest it has been our feeling for some time that appropriate exploitation of this kind would be most helpful. This however is so strictly a State Department issue that we feel that we can only state our view that State should examine the possibilities with a view to doing anything which it can justify.

f. With regard to paragraph 5 dealing with the Far East, I can only say that again I would like to have the factual premises carefully checked and state that it has been the regular line through such assets as we have (which as you know are pretty limited on the Mainland) to use any and all subjects which might be a basis for separating the Chinese communists from the USSR.

g. One additional point which I would like to add on my own - namely that the questions raised by Mr. Jackson seem to me to depend fundamentally on the answer to what the United States is trying to accomplish both in the immediate future and in the longer range future in relation to the European satellites. This problem has been raised by Mr. Conant a number of times and has been raised by various individuals in CIA a number of times. It has been our feeling for some time that unless we are prepared to support, in some substantial way, active opposition to the Soviet by the peoples of the satellites, we should be extremely cautious about either fostering such opposition or giving it too much encouragement without aid in case it should break out spontaneously. The reason for this is obvious, namely that absent really useful help, the other support can only buy us a very short term good will which will, in all likelihood, backfire into resentment in case punishment is meted out and no real freedom obtained. This

caution seems

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

caution seems to us particularly important to consider at the moment since the Russian intention to remain in the areas in question, particularly East Germany, appears to be far firmer at this time than was the case on June 17. Consequently it may not be unreasonable to assume that more severer measures will be used to quell opposition should it occur at present than was the case on June 17.

25X1A

CPP

SECRET

Security Information

I don't know
that we have a
copy of this - would
better keep it somewhere -
perhaps with the D40/45
stuff WJ